


MEMORANDUM FOR: Messrs. ~~Proctor~~ and ~~Walsh~~

This is Colby's reaction to the post-mortem on Cambodia. Do you want to add a short note of "thanks" to the copies for the offices involved, or have me send copies only of Colby's covering memo?



10.9.73  
(DATE)

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1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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<b>Remarks:</b>  <p>The Director has sent me the attached memorandum commenting on the Cambodian post-mortem prepared on 14 September. You may show the memo to those in your shop who participated in the project.</p> <p>Please thank the authors in my behalf.</p> <p>cc: ONE, SAVA, DDO</p>					
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER					
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.				DATE	
EDWARD W. PROCTOR DDI <input type="text"/>				10.9.73	
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(40)

DDI-4584-73

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5 October 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDI

SUBJECT: Post-Mortem on CIA Reporting on the Situation  
in Cambodia after the Bombing Halt

1. I have read with interest this OCI-prepared post-mortem, and am sending it on to the IC Staff as an indication of the kind of backward look we should take at our performance on selected subjects. Please pass my thanks along to those in OCI, SAVA, ONE, OER, and the DDO who contributed to the project.

2. It does seem to me that this paper is a bit overly defensive about the failure of last May's SNIE to predict the full effect of the final bombing campaign on the Khmer Communists. While it is true we had no formal notice of the scale of bombing the U. S. was going to undertake, my question is whether it really amounted to all that different a level than we would have assumed. (Our previous estimates have not tended to overstress the effectiveness of large scale bombing elsewhere in Southeast Asia). In other words, in post-mortems let's call them straight and hard. (As you know, I associate myself with this "failure", as I too expected more immediately dire consequences from an end to the bombing).

  
W. E. Colby  
Director

cc: D/DCI/IC

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